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Abstract
Upon starting a collective endeavour, it is important to understand your partners’ preferences and how
strongly they commit to a common goal. Establishing a prior commitment or agreement in terms of pos-
terior benefits and consequences from those engaging in it provides an important mechanism for securing
cooperation. Resorting to methods from Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT), here we analyse how prior
commitments can also be adopted as a tool for enhancing coordination when its outcomes exhibit an
asymmetric payoff structure, in both pairwise and multiparty interactions. Arguably, coordination is more
complex to achieve than cooperation since there might be several desirable collective outcomes in a coor-
dination problem (compared to mutual cooperation, the only desirable collective outcome in cooperation
dilemmas). Our analysis, both analytically and via numerical simulations, shows that whether prior com-
mitment would be a viable evolutionary mechanism for enhancing coordination and the overall population
social welfare strongly depends on the collective benefit and severity of competition, and more importantly,
how asymmetric benefits are resolved in a commitment deal. Moreover, in multiparty interactions, prior
commitments prove to be crucial when a high level of group diversity is required for optimal coordination.
The results are robust for different selection intensities. Overall, our analysis provides new insights into
the complexity and beauty of behavioral evolution driven by humans’ capacity for commitment, as well
as for the design of self-organised and distributed multi-agent systems for ensuring coordination among
autonomous agents.




Achieving a collective endeavour among individuals with their own personal interest is an important2
social and economic challenge in various societies (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990; Pitt et al., 2012; Barrett,3
2016; Sigmund, 2010). From coordinating individuals in the workplace to maintaining cooperative and4
trust-based relationship among organisations and nations, it success is often jeopardised by individual5
self-interest (Barrett et al., 2007; Perc et al., 2017). The study of mechanisms that support the evolution6
of such collective behaviours has been of great interest in many disciplines, ranging from Evolutionary7
Biology, Economics, Physics and Computer Science (Nowak, 2006; Sigmund, 2010; Tuyls and Parsons,8
2007; West et al., 2007; Han, 2013; Perc et al., 2017; Andras et al., 2018; Kumar et al., 2020). Several9
mechanisms responsible for the emergence and stability of collective behaviours among such individuals,10
have been proposed, including kin and group selection, direct and indirect reciprocities, spatial networks,11
reward and punishment (Nowak, 2006; West et al., 2007; Perc et al., 2017; Okada, 2020; Skyrms, 1996).12
Recently, establishing prior commitments has been proposed as an evolutionarily viable strategy in-13
ducing cooperative behaviour in the context of pairwise and multi-player cooperation dilemmas (Nesse,14
2001; Frank, 1988; Han et al., 2017, 2015a; Sasaki et al., 2015; Arvanitis et al., 2019; Ohtsuki, 2018);15
namely, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) (Han et al., 2013; Hasan and Raja, 2013) and the Public Goods16
Game (PGG) (Han et al., 2015a, 2017; Kurzban et al., 2001). It provides an enhancement to different17
forms of punishment against inappropriate behaviours and of rewards to stimulate the appropriate ones18
(Chen et al., 2014; Martinez-Vaquero et al., 2015, 2017; Sasaki et al., 2015; Powers et al., 2012; Szolnoki19
and Perc, 2012; Cimpeanu et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2019), allowing ones to efficiently avoid free-riders20
(Han and Lenaerts, 2016; Han et al., 2015b) and resolve the antisocial punishment problem (Han, 2016).21
These works have primarily focused on modelling prior commitments for improving mutual cooperation22
among self-interested agents. In the context of cooperation dilemma games (i.e. PD and PGG), mutual23
cooperation is the only desirable collective outcome to which all parties are required to commit if an agree-24
ment is to be formed. The same argument is applied to other pairwise and multi-player social dilemmas25
such as the Stag-Hunt and Chicken games, since although the nature of the games is different from the PD26
and PGG, mutual cooperation is the only desirable outcome to be achieved (Santos et al., 2006; Pacheco27
et al., 2009; Skyrms, 2003). In other contexts such as coordination problems, this is not the case anymore28
since there might be multiple optimal or desirable collective outcomes and players might have distinct,29
incompatible preferences regarding which outcome a mutual agreement should aim to achieve (e.g. due to30
asymmetric benefits). Such coordination problems are abundant in nature, ranging from collective hunting31
and foraging to international climate change actions and multi-sector coordination (Santos and Pacheco,32
2011; Ostrom, 1990; Barrett, 2016; Ohtsuki, 2018; Bianca and Han, 2019; Skyrms, 1996; Santos et al.,33
2016).34
Hence, we explore how arranging a prior agreement or commitment can be used as a mechanism35
for enhancing coordination and the population social welfare in this type of coordination problems, in36
both pairwise and multi-player interaction settings. Before individuals embark on a joint venture, a pre-37
agreement makes the motives and intentions of all parties involved more transparent, thereby enabling38
an easier coordination of personal interests (Nesse, 2001; Cohen and Levesque, 1990; Han, 2013; Han39
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et al., 2015b). Although our approach is applicable for a wide range of coordination problems (e.g.40
single market product investments as described above), we will frame our models within the technology41
investment strategic decision making problem, allowing us to describe the models clearly. Namely, we42
describe technology adoption games capturing the competitive market and decision-making process among43
firms adopting new technologies (Zhu and Weyant, 2003; Bardhan et al., 2004), with a key parameter α44
representing how competitive the market is (thus describing how important coordination is). Similar to45
previous commitment models, we will perform theoretical analysis and numerical simulations resorting46
to stochastic methods from Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Sigmund47
et al., 2010).48
We will start by modelling a pairwise technology adoption decision making, where two investment49
firms (or players) competing within a same product market who need to make strategic decision on which50
technology to adopt (Zhu and Weyant, 2003; Chevalier-Roignant et al., 2011), a low-benefit (L) or a high-51
benefit (H) technology. Individually, adopting H would lead to a larger benefit. However, if both firms52
invest on H they would end up competing with each other leading to a smaller accumulated benefit than53
if they could coordinate with each other to choose different technologies. However, given the asymmetry54
in the benefits in such an outcome, clearly no firm would want to commit to the outcome where its option55
is L, unless some form of compensation from the one selecting H can be ensured.56
We then extend and generalize the pairwise model to a multi-player one, capturing the strategic inter-57
action between more than two investment firms. In the multi-player model, a key parameter µ is ascribed58
to the market demand of high technology, i.e. what is the optimal fraction of the firms in a group to59
adopt H. We analytically examine how players can be coordinated when there is a market demand for a60
particular technology. We show that differently from the two-player game, the newly defined parameter µ61
leads to a new kind of complexity when trying to achieve group coordination. When there is a high level62
of diversity in demand (i.e. intermediate values of µ), as can be seen in different technologies adoption63
contexts (Beede and Young, 1998; Schewe and Stuart, 2015), introducing prior commitment can lead to64
significant improvement in the levels of coordination and population social welfare.65
The next section discusses related work, which is followed by a description of our models and details66
of the EGT methods for analysing them. Results of the analysis and a final discussion will then follow.67
2 Related Work68
The problem of explaining the emergence and stability of collective behaviours has been actively addressed69
in different disciplines (Nowak, 2006; Sigmund, 2010). Among other mechanisms, such as reciprocity and70
costly punishment, closely related to our present model is the study of cooperative behaviours and pre-71
commitment in cooperation dilemmas, for both two-player and multiplayer games (Han et al., 2013, 2017;72
Sasaki et al., 2015; Hasan and Raja, 2013; Quillien, 2020). It has shown that to enhance cooperation73
commitments need to be sufficiently enforced and the cost of setting up the commitments is justified74
with respect to the benefit derived from the interactions—both by means of theoretical analysis and75
of behavioural experiments (Ostrom, 1990; Cherry and McEvoy, 2013; Kurzban et al., 2001; Chen and76
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Komorita, 1994; Arvanitis et al., 2019). Our results show that this same observation is seen for coordination77
problems. However, arranging commitments for enhancing coordination is more complex, exhibiting a78
larger behavioural space, and furthermore, their outcomes strongly depend on new factors only appearing79
in coordination problems; namely, a successful commitment deal needs to take into account the fact that80
multiple desirable collective outcomes exist for which players have incompatible preferences; and thus how81
benefits can be shared through compensations in order to resolve the issues of asymmetric benefits, is82
crucially important (Bianca and Han, 2019).83
We moved further by expanding our two-player game in the previous work to a multi-player model, the84
outcome has shown to be more complex as there are more players involved. We yet again investigated how85
coordination and cooperation can be improved using prior commitment deal when there are multiple play-86
ers involved and also when there is a particular market demand (Bianca and Han, 2019). Our approach in87
exploring how implementing prior commitment enhances cooperation dilemma has also been investigated88
by previous researchers in the past (Chen and Komorita, 1994). A good level of cooperation was seen in a89
Public Good Game experiment when there was a binding agreement made during the prior communication90
stage among members of the group. They hypothesized that if members of a group are allowed to make a91
pledge (a degree of bindings/commitment) before their actual decisions, they will be able to communicate92
their intentions and it will overall increase cooperation rate in the population. As predicted, their results93
clearly demonstrate that making a pledge improves cooperation although the degree of commitment re-94
quired in the pledge deferentially affected the cooperation rate (Chen and Komorita, 1994; Cherry and95
McEvoy, 2013; Kurzban et al., 2001).96
There have been several other works studying the evolution of coordination, using the so-called Stag97
Hunt game, see e.g. (Skyrms, 2003; Pacheco et al., 2009; Santos et al., 2006; Sigmund, 2010). However, to98
the best of our knowledge there has been no work studying how prior commitments can be modelled and99
used for enhancing the outcome of the evolution of coordination. As our results below show, significant100
enhancement of coordination and population welfare can be achieved via the arrangement of suitable101
commitment deals.102
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that commitments have been studied extensively in Artificial Intelligence103
and Multi-agent systems literature, see e.g. (Singh, 1991; Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010; Chopra and104
Singh, 2009; Rzadca et al., 2015; Harrenstein et al., 2007; Winikoff, 2007). Differently from our work, these105
studies utilise commitments for the purpose of regulating individual and collective behaviours, formalising106
different aspects of commitments (such as norms and conventions) in multi-agent systems. However, our107
results and approach provide important new insights into the design of such systems as these require108
commitments to ensure high levels of efficient collaboration and coordination within a group or team of109
agents. For example, by providing suitable agreement deals agents can improve the chance that a desirable110
collective outcome (which is best for the systems as a whole) is reached even when benefits provided by111
the outcome are different for the parties involved.112
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3 Models and Methods113
In the following , we first describe a two-player technology adoption game then extend it with the option of114
arranging prior commitments before playing the game. We then present a multi-player version of the model,115
with and without commitments, too. Then, we describe the methods, which are based on Evolutionary116
Game Theory for finite populations, which will be used to analyse the resulting models.117
3.1 Two-player Tech Adoption (TD) Game118
3.1.1 Two-player TD Without Commitments119
We consider the scenario that two firms (players) compete for the same product market, and they need120
to make a (strategic) decision on which technology to invest on, a low-benefit (L) or a high-benefit (H)121
technology. The outcome of the interaction can be described in terms of costs and benefits of investments122
by the following payoff matrix (for row player):123
( H L
H αbH − cH bH − cH








where cL, cH and bL, bH (bL ≤ bH) represent the costs and benefits of investing on L and H, respectively;124
α ∈ (0, 1) indicates the competitive level of the product market: the firms receive a partial benefit if125
they both choose to invest on the same technology. Collectively, the smaller α is (i.e. the higher the126
market competitiveness), the more important that the firms coordinate to choose different technologies.127
For simplicity, the entries of the payoff matrix are denoted by a, b, c, d, as above. We have b > a128
and c > d. Without loss of generality, we assume that H would generate a greater net benefit, i.e.129
c = bL − cL < bH − cH = b.130
Note that although we describe our model in terms of technology adoption decision making, it is gener-131
ally applicable to many other coordination problems for instance wherever there are strategic investment132
decisions to make (in competitive markets of any products) (Zhu and Weyant, 2003; Chevalier-Roignant133
et al., 2011).134
3.1.2 Two-player TD in Presence of Commitments135
We now extend the model allowing players to have the option to arrange a prior commitment before a136
TD interaction. A commitment proposal is to ask the co-player to adopt a different technology. That is,137
a strategist intending to use H (resp., L) would ask the co-player to adopt L (resp., H). We denote these138
commitment proposing strategies as HP and LP, respectively. Similarly to previous models of commitments139
(for PD and PGG) (Han et al., 2013, 2015a), to make the commitment deal reliable, a proposer pays an140
arrangement cost ε. If the co-player agrees with the deal, then the proposer assumes that the opponent141
will adopt the agreed choice, yet there is no guarantee that this will actually be the case. Thus whenever142
a co-player refuses to commit, HP and LP would play H in the game. When the co-player accepts the143
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commitment though later does not honour it, she has to compensate the honouring co-player at a personal144
cost δ.145
Differently from previous models on PD and PGG where an agreed outcome leads to the same payoff146
for all parties in the agreement (mutual cooperation benefit), in the current model such an outcome would147
lead to different payoffs for those involved. Therefore, as part of the agreement, HP would compensate148
after the game an amount θ1 to accepted player that honours the agreement; while LP would request a149
compensation θ2 from such an accepted co-player.150
Besides HP and LP, we consider a minimal model with the following (basic) strategies in this commit-151
ment version:152
• Non-proposing acceptors, HC and LC, who always commit when being proposed a commitment deal153
wherein they are willing to adopt any technology proposed (even when it is different from their154
intended choice), honour the adopted agreement, but do not propose a commitment themselves.155
They play their intended choice, i.e. H and L, respectively, when there is no agreement in place;156
• Non-acceptors, HN and LN, who do not accept commitment, play their intended choice during the157
game, and do not propose commitments;158
• Fake committers, HF and LF, who accept a commitment proposal yet play the choice opposite to159
what has been agreed whenever the game takes place. These players assume that they can exploit160
the commitment proposing players without suffering the consequences 1.161
Note that similar to the commitment models for the PD game (Han et al., 2013), some possible strategies162
have been excluded from the analysis since they are dominated by at least one of the strategies in any163
configuration of the game: they can be omitted without changing the outcome of the analysis. For164
example, those who propose a commitment (i.e. paying a cost ε) but then do not honour (thus have165
to pay the compensation when facing a honouring acceptors) would be dominated by the corresponding166
non-proposers.167
Together the model consists of eight strategies that define the following payoff matrix, capturing the168
average payoffs that each strategy will receive upon interaction with one of the other seven strategies169
(where we denote λ = θ1 + θ2, λ1 = b− ε− θ1, λ2 = c− ε+ θ2, λ3 = a− ε+ δ and λ4 = d− ε+ δ, just for170
1Compared to cooperation dilemmas such as PD and PGG, fake strategies make less sense in the context of coordination
games since they would not earn the temptation payoff by adopting a different choice from what being agreed. Moreover, in
the presence of an agreement, players obtain an additional compensation when adopting the disadvantageous choice (i.e. L).
We will keep the fake strategies in the analysis of pairwise games for confirmation of these intuitions but will exclude them
from multi-player settings for simplicity, without being detrimental to the results.
7
the sake of clear representation)171











a b λ2 λ2 λ4 λ4
HN a a a b a b a b
LN c c c d c d c d
HC c+ θ1 b− θ2 a b a b a b
LC c+ θ1 b− θ2 c d c d c d
HF a− δ d− δ a b a b a b
LF a− δ d− δ c d c d c d

. (2)
Note that when two commitment proposers interact only one of them will need to pay the cost of setting up172
the commitment. Yet, as either one of them can take this action they pay this cost only half of the time (on173
average). In addition, the average payoff of HP when interacting with LP is given by 12 (b−ε−θ1 +b−θ2) =174
1
2 (2b− ε− θ1 − θ2). When two HP players interact, each receives
1
2 (b− ε− θ1 + c+ θ1) =
1
2 (b+ c− ε).175
We say that an agreement is fair if both parties obtain the same benefit when they honour it (after176
having taken into account the cost of setting up the agreement). For that, we can show that θ1 and θ2 must177
satisfy θ1 =
b−c−ε
2 and θ2 =
b−c+ε
2 , and thus, both parties obtain
b+c−ε
2 . Indeed, they can be achieved178
by comparing the payoffs of HP and HC when they interact, i.e. b − ε − θ1 = c + θ1, where solving this179
equation we would obtain θ1 =
b−c−ε
2 .180
With these conditions it also ensures that the payoffs of HP and LP when interacting with each other181
are equal. Our analysis below will first focus on whether and when the fair agreements can lead to182
improvement in terms of coordination and the overall social welfare (i.e. average population payoff). We183
will discuss how different kinds of agreements (varying θ1 and θ2) affect the outcome, with additional184
results provided in Appendix.185
3.2 Multi-Player Tech Adoption (TD) Game186
3.2.1 Multi-player TD Without Commitments187
We now describe a N -player (N > 2) version of the TD model. Again, as before, we will introduce the188
model in the context of technology investment market decision making. In a group (of size N) with k189
players of type H (i.e., N − k players of type L), the expected payoffs of playing H and L can be written190
as follows191
ΠH(k) = αH(k)bH − cH ,
ΠL(k) = αL(k)bL − cL,
(3)
where αH(k) and αL(k) represent the fraction of the benefit obtained by H and L players, respectively,192
which depend on the composition of the group, k. For two-player TD, both are equal to α. To generalize193
for N -player TD interactions, they should also depend on the demand for high technology (H) in the194
group, describing what is the maximal number of players in the group that can adopt H without reducing195
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their benefit due to competition. Let us denote this number by µ (where 1 ≤ µ ≤ N). For example,196
intermediate values of µ indicate a high level of group diversity is needed for optimal coordination. When197
µ = N , it means there is a significant market demand of the high benefit technology so that all firms can198
adopt it without leading to competition.199
Hence, we define200
αH(k) =




1, if k ≥ µ,α2(N−µ)
N−k otherwise.
(5)
The rationale of these definitions is that whenever k ≤ µ, full benefits from adopting H can be obtained,201
and moreover, if k > µ, the larger k the stronger the competition is among H adopters. Similarly for L202
adopters. The parameters α1 and α2 stand for the intensities of competition for investing in H and in L,203
respectively. For simplicity we assume in this paper α1 = α2 = α. Note that for N = 2 we recover the204
two-player model given in Equation (1) , given that the current α is scaled (by 2) compared to the value205
of α in the pairwise game, solely for the purpose of a clear presentation.206
The optimal group payoff is achieved when there are exactly µ players adopting H and the rest adopting
L, leading to an average payoff for each member given by
A :=
µ(bH − cH) + (N − µ)(bL − cL)
N
.
3.2.2 Multi-player TD in Presence of Commitments207
We can define the N -player game version with prior commitments in a similar fashion as in the two-player208
game. Commitment proposing strategists (i.e. HP and LP players) will propose before an interaction209
that the group will play the optimal arrangement (so that every player obtains an average payoff A). For210
simplicity, we assume that the committed players adopt the fair agreement, i.e. every member will obtain211
the same payoff after compensation is made to those adopting L. As such, we don’t need to consider who212
will adopt H or L, as all would receive the same payoff at the end. Moreover, whenever a player in the213
group refuses to commit, commitment proposers will adopt H. Details of payoff calculation will be provided214
in Results section (cf. Table 1).215
3.3 Evolutionary Dynamics216
In this work, we will perform theoretical analysis and numerical simulations (see next section) using EGT
methods for finite populations (Nowak et al., 2004; Imhof et al., 2005; Hauert et al., 2007). Let Z be
the size of the population. In such a setting, individuals’ payoff represents their fitness or social success,
and evolutionary dynamics is shaped by social learning (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Sigmund, 2010),
whereby the most successful individuals will tend to be imitated more often by the other individuals. In
the current work, social learning is modelled using the so-called pairwise comparison rule (Traulsen et al.,
9
2006), a standard approach in EGT, assuming that an individual A with fitness fA adopts the strategy of






The parameter β represents the ‘imitation strength’ or ‘intensity of selection’, i.e., how strongly the in-217
dividuals base their decision to imitate on fitness difference between themselves and the opponents. For218
β = 0, we obtain the limit of neutral drift – the imitation decision is random. For large β, imitation219
becomes increasingly deterministic.220
In the absence of mutations or exploration, the end states of evolution are inevitably monomorphic:221
once such a state is reached, it cannot be escaped through imitation. We thus further assume that, with222
a certain mutation probability, an individual switches randomly to a different strategy without imitating223
another individual. In the limit of small mutation rates, the dynamics will proceed with, at most, two224
strategies in the population, such that the behavioural dynamics can be conveniently described by a Markov225
Chain, where each state represents a monomorphic population, whereas the transition probabilities are226
given by the fixation probability of a single mutant (Imhof et al., 2005; Nowak et al., 2004; Hauert et al.,227
2007). The resulting Markov Chain has a stationary distribution, which characterises the average time228
the population spends in each of these monomorphic end states. It has been shown to have a range of229
applicability which goes well beyond the strict limit of very small mutation (or exploration) rates (Hauert230
et al., 2007; Sigmund, 2010; Han et al., 2012; Sigmund et al., 2010; Rand et al., 2013).231
Before describing how to calculate this stationary distribution, we need to show how payoffs are calcu-232
lated, which differ for two-player and N-player settings, as below.233
• Average Payoff for the Two Player Game234
Let πij represent the payoff obtained by strategist i in each pairwise interaction with strategist j, as235
defined in the payoff matrices in Equations (1) and (2). Suppose there are at most two strategies in236
the population, say, x individuals using i (0 ≤ x ≤ Z) and (Z − x) individuals using j. Thus the237
average payoff of the individual that uses i or j can be written respectively as follows238
Πi(x) =








• Expected Payoff in The Multiplayer Game
In the case of N -player interactions, suppose the population includes x individuals of type i and
Z−x individuals of type j. The probability to select k individuals of type i and N −k individuals of
type j, in N trails, is given by the hypergeometric distribution as follows (Sigmund, 2010; Gokhale
and Traulsen, 2010)















































Now, for both two-player and N -player settings, the probability to change the number x of individuals241










The fixation probability of a single mutant with a strategy i in a population of (Z − 1) individuals using243









Considering a set {1, ..., q} of different strategies, these fixation probabilities determine a transition matrix245
M = {Tij}qi,j=1, with Tij,j 6=i = ρji/(q− 1) and Tii = 1−
∑q
j=1,j 6=i Tij , of a Markov Chain. The normalised246
eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue 1 of the transposed of M provides the stationary distribution247
described above (Imhof et al., 2005), describing the relative time the population spends adopting each of248
the strategies.249
Risk-dominance An important measure to determine the evolutionary dynamic of a given strategy is250
its risk-dominance against others. For the two strategies i and j, risk-dominance is a criterion which251
determine which selection direction is more probable: an i mutant is able to fixating in a homogeneous252
population of agents using j or a j mutant fixating in a homogeneous population of individuals playing i.253
In the case, for instance, the first was more probable than the latter then we say that i is risk-dominant254
against j (Nowak et al., 2004; Sigmund, 2010) which holds for any intensity of selection and in the limit255







This condition is applicable for both two-player games, N = 2, and when N-player games with N > 2257
(Sigmund, 2010; Gokhale and Traulsen, 2010). It will allow us to derive analytical conditions such as when258




Cost of investing in high technology, H cH
Cost of investing in low technology, L cL
Benefit of investing in high technology, H bH
Benefit of investing in low technology, L bL
Competitive level of the market α
Group size (in N-player TD games) N
Optimal number of H-adopters in a group of N players µ
Cost of arranging a commitment ε
Compensation paid by dishonouring commitment acceptors δ
Compensation paid by HP to honouring commitment acceptors θ1
Compensation paid to LP by commitment acceptors θ2
Table 1: List of parameters in the models.
4 Results261
We will first describe results for two-player games, then proceeding to provide those for the N -player262
version. Table 1 summarizes the key parameters in both versions, for ease of following.263
4.1 Two-player TD Game Results264
4.1.1 Analytical Conditions for the Viability of Commitment Proposers265
To begin with, using the conditions given in Equation 10, we obtain that if
θ1 + θ2 < b− c
then HP is risk-dominant (see Methods) against LP. Otherwise, LP is risk-dominant against HP.266
Similarly, we derive the conditions regarding the commitment parameters for which HP and LP are267
evolutionarily viable strategies, i.e. when they are risk-dominant against all other non-proposing ones.268
Indeed, HP and LP are risk-dominant against all other six non-proposing strategies, respectively, if and269
only if270
ε < min{b+ c− 2a, 3b− c− 2d, 3b− c− 2a− 4θ1
3
,
3b− c− 2d− 4θ1
3
,
b+ c− 2a+ 4δ
3
,
b+ c− 2d+ 4δ
3
},
ε < min{b+ c− 2a, 3b− c− 2d, 3c− b− 2a+ 4θ2
3
,
3c− b− 2d+ 4θ2
3
,
b+ c− 2a+ 4δ
3
,




Note that each element in the min expressions above corresponds to the condition for one of the six271
non-proposing strategies HN, LN, HC, LC, HF, LF, respectively.272
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(3ε− b− c+ 2 max{a, d}) .
(12)
In particular, for fair agreements, i.e. θ1 = (b− c− ε)/2 and θ2 = (b− c+ ε)/2, we obtain274




(3ε− b− c+ 2 max{a, d}) .
(13)
It is because 3b− c− 2d > b+ c− 2 max{a, d}, which is due to b > c and max{a, d} ≥ d.275
In general, these conditions indicate that for commitments to be a viable option for improving coordi-276
nation, the cost of arrangement ε must be sufficiently small while the compensation associated with the277
contract needs to be sufficiently large (see already Figure 2 for numerical validation). Furthermore, for the278
first condition to hold, it is necessary that b+c > 2 max{a, d}. It means that the total payoff of two players279
when playing the TD game is always greater when they can coordinate to choose different technologies,280
than when they both choose the same technology.281
Moreover, the conditions in Equation 13 can be expressed in terms of α and the costs and benefits of




+ min{cH + bL − cL − ε
2bH
,






+ min{cH + bL − cL − 3ε+ 4δ
2bH
,
cL + bH − cH − 3ε+ 4δ
2bL
},




+ min{cH + bL − cL −max{ε, 3ε− 4δ}
2bH
,
cL + bH − cH −max{ε, 3ε− 4δ}
2bL
}. (14)
This condition indicates under what condition of the market competitiveness and the costs and benefits of283
investing in available technologies, commitments can be an evolutionarily viable mechanism. Intuitively,284
for given costs and benefits of investment (i.e. fixing cL, cH , bL, bH), a larger cost of arranging a (reliable)285
agreement, ε, leads to a smaller threshold of α where commitment is viable. Moreover, given a commitment286
system (i.e. fixing ε and δ), assuming similar costs of investment for the two technologies, then a larger287
ratio of the benefits obtained from the two technologies, bH/bL, leads to a smaller upper bound for α for288
which commitment is viable.289
Remarkably, our numerical analysis below (see already Figure 1) shows that the condition in Equation290
14 accurately predicts the threshold of α where commitment proposing strategies (i.e. HP and LP) are291
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highly abundant in the population, leading to improvement in terms of the average population payoff292
compared to when commitment is absent (Figure 3). For example, when ε = 0.1, 1 and 2, the upper293
bounds for α are 0.658, 0.583 and 0.5, respectively.294
On the other hand, when α is sufficiently large, little improvement can be achieved, especially when295
bH/bL is large (which is in accordance with the analytical results above).296
4.1.2 Numerical Results for Pairwise TD game297
We calculate the stationary distribution in a population of eight strategies, HP, LP, HN, LN, HC, LC,298
HF and LF, using methods described above. In Figure 1, we show the frequency of these strategies as a299
function of α, for different values of ε and game configurations. In general, the commitment proposing300
strategies HP and LP dominate the population when α is small while HN and HC dominate when α is301
sufficiently large even with different values of β utilized in the comparison. That is, commitment proposing302
strategies are viable and successful whenever the market competitiveness is high, leading to the need of303
efficient coordination among the competing players/firms to ensure high benefits. Notably, we observe that304
the thresholds of α below which HP and LP are dominant, closely corroborate the analytical condition305
described in Equation 14, in all cases. This observation is also robust for different values of intensity of306
selection, β.307
This observation is robust for varying commitment parameters, i.e. the cost of arranging commitment,308
ε, and the compensation cost associated with commitment, δ, see Figure 2. Namely, we show the total309
frequency of commitment strategies (i.e. sum of the frequencies of HP and LP) for varying these parameters310
and for different values of α. It can be seen that, in general, the commitment strategies dominate the311
population whenever ε is sufficiently small and δ is sufficiently large. This observation is in accordance312
with previous commitment modelling works for the cooperation dilemma games (Han et al., 2013, 2015a,313
2017). In addition, we observe that in the current coordination problem, that the smaller α is, these314
commitment strategies dominate the population for wider range of ε and δ. Our additional results show315
that these observations are robust with respect to other game configurations, including β (comparing the316
three rows in Figure 2.317
Now, in order to determine whether and when commitments can actually lead to meaningful improve-318
ment, in Figure 3, we compare the average population payoff or social welfare when a commitment is319
present and when it is absent. In general, it can be seen that when α is sufficiently small (below a thresh-320
old), the smaller it is, the greater improvement of social welfare is achieved through the presence of a321
commitment deal. Moreover, the smaller the cost of arranging commitments, ε, the greater improvement322
is obtained. When α is sufficiently large, commitment leads to no improvement or might even be detri-323
mental for social welfare, especially when bH/bL is large (which is in accordance with the analytical results324
above). The detriment is further increased when β is small. We can observe that the thresholds for which325
a notable improvement can be achieved is the same as the one for the viability of HP and LP (i.e. as326
described in Equation 14).327
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Figure 1: Frequency of the eight strategies, HP, LP, HN, LN, HC, LC, HF and LF, as a function
of α, for different values of ε and β. In general, the commitment proposing strategies HP and LP dominate the
population when α is small while HN and HC dominate when α is sufficiently large in all cases, which is robust for
different values of intensity of selection, β. The HN and HC dominate the population as the market competition
decreases (i.e. when α increases). Larger values of β increase the difference between strategies’ frequencies but do
not change the outcomes in general. Parameters: in all panels cH = 1, cL = 1, bL = 2 (i.e. c = 1), bH = 6 (i.e.
b = 5). Other parameters: δ = 6; β = 0.01, 0.1 and 1; population size Z = 100; Fair agreements are used, where θ1
and θ2 are given by θ1 = (b− c− ε)/2 and θ2 = (b− c+ ε)/2.
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Figure 2: Total frequency of commitment strategies (i.e. sum of the frequencies of HP and LP), as a
function of ε and δ, for different values of α and β. Primarily, the commitment proposing strategies dominate the
population whenever ε is sufficiently small and δ is sufficiently large. Furthermore, the smaller α, these commitment
strategies dominate for a wider range of ε and δ, especially when α is smaller. These observations are robust for
different values of β. Nevertheless, a larger β leads to a greater frequency of commitment proposing strategies
where they are evolutionarily viable, and a lower frequency otherwise. Parameters: in all panels cH = 1, cL = 1,
bL = 2 (i.e. c = 1), and bH = 6 (i.e. b = 5). Other parameters: β = 0.01 in the first, β = 0.1 in the second
and β = 1 in the third row; population size Z = 100; Fair agreements are used, where θ1 and θ2 are given by
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Figure 3: Average population payoff as a function of α, when commitment is absent and when it
is present, for different values of ε and β. We observed that when α is small, significant improvement in
terms of the average population payoff can be achieved through prior commitment. When α is sufficiently large,
commitment leads to no improvement or might even be detrimental for social welfare, especially when β is small.
That is, at α = 0.7 in panel a and α = 0.9 in panel d, without commitment will be more beneficial. Parameters:
in all panels cH = 1, cL = 1, bL = 2 (i.e. c = 1); in panel a, b and c) bH = 6 (i.e. b = 5) with β = 0.01, 0.1 and 1
respectively. Also, in panels d, e and f) bH = 3 (i.e. b = 2) with β = 0.01, 0.1 and 1 respectively; Other parameters:
δ = 6; population size Z = 100; Fair agreements are used, where θ1 and θ2 are given by θ1 = (b − c − ε)/2 and
θ2 = (b− c+ ε)/2.
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Focal Player (i) Opponent (j) Πi,j(k)
HP, LP HP, LP A− ε/N
HP, LP HC, LC A− ε/k
HP, LP HN ΠH(N) (for k < N)
HP, LP LN ΠH(k) (for k < N)
HN HP, LP, HN, HC ΠH(N)
HN LN, LC ΠH(k)
LN HP, HN, HC ΠL(k)
LN LN, LC ΠL(N)
LN LP ΠL(k)
HC, LC HP, LP A (for k < N)
HC HN, HC ΠH(N)
HC LN, LC ΠH(k)
LC HN, HC ΠL(k)
LC LN, LC ΠL(N)
Table 2: Average payoffs of focal strategy i when facing strategy j, in a group of k former and N − k latter
strategists.
4.2 Multiplayer Game Results328
4.2.1 Payoff Derivation in N-player TD game329
As mentioned above, compared to cooperation dilemmas such as PD and PGG, fake strategies make less330
sense in the context of coordination games since they would not earn the temptation payoff by adopting a331
different choice from what being agreed. To focus on the group effect and the effect of the newly introduced332
parameter µ, we will consider a population consisting of HP, LP, HN, LN, HC and LC (i.e. excluding fake333
strategies). As shown in the two-player game analysis, the fake strategies (i.e. HF and LF) are not viable334
options in TD games and can be ignored. It is equivalent to consider to the full set of strategies with a335
sufficiently large δ.336
First of all, we derive the payoffs received by each strategy when encountering specific other strategies337
(see a summary in Table 2). Namely, Πij(k) and Πji(k) denote the payoffs of a strategist of type i and338
j, respectively, in a group consisting of k player of type i and N − k players of type j. The first column339
of the table lists all possible strategies which can be used by player i (focal player), where as the second340
column shows strategies of co-players (opponents). The third column shows the payoffs of focal players.341
342
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4.2.2 Analytical conditions for the viability of commitment proposers in N-player TD game343
We now derive the conditions under which HP is risk-dominant against the rest of strategies. Since we344
assume fair agreements, the conditions for LP would be equivalent to those for HP in terms of risk-345
dominance. For ease of following the derivations below, we recall that A denotes the optimal group346
payoff achieved when there are exactly µ players adopting H and the rest adopting L, that is, A :=347
1
N (µ(bH − cH) + (N − µ)(bL − cL)).348




















































































Figure 4: Frequency of the six strategies HP, LP, HN, LN, HC and LC, as a function of ε in a N-player
game with commitment, for different values of µ. In the N-player game, the new parameter µ describes the
market demand for a high technology, which was set to 1 in the pairwise game. HP and LP have a high frequency for
sufficiently small ε for µ = 2 in both games, and also when µ = 1 for the first, easy coordinate situation (first row).
When µ = 5, i.e. when all players can adopt H without benefit reduction, HC always dominate and commitment
strategies are not successful. This means that when there is a need for a diversity of technology adoption, initiating
prior commitments to enhance coordination is important. Parameters: in panel a, b and c) bH = 6 (i.e. b = 5)
with µ = 1, 2, 5 respectively. Also, in panel d,e and f) bH = 3 (i.e. b = 2) with µ = 1, 2, 5 respectively; Other
parameters: N = 5, β = 0.1; α = 0.5; cH = 1, cL = 1, bL = 2 (i.e. c = 1); .
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Figure 5: Frequency of the six strategies HP, LP, HN, LN, HC and LC, as a function of α in a
multiplayer game with commitment, for different values of ε and also two different game configurations. In
general, the commitment proposing strategies (HP and LP) decrease in frequency for increasing α. They dominate
over other strategies for sufficiently small α and ε. That is, it is more beneficial to engage in a prior commitment
deal when the market competition is fierce and the cost of arranging the commitment is very minimal. Parameters:
in all panels cH = 1, cL = 1, bL = 2 (i.e. c = 1); in panel a, b and c) bH = 6 (i.e. b = 5) with ε = 0.1, 1 and 2,
respectively. Also, in panel d, e and f: bH = 3 (i.e. b = 2) with ε = 0.1, 1 and 2 respectively; Other parameters:













In short, in order for commitment proposers to be risk-dominant against all other strategies, it requires354
that ε is sufficiently small, namely, smaller than minimum of the right hand sides of Equations (15)-(18).355
4.3 Numerical Results for N-player TD game356
We compute stationary distributions in a population of six strategies HP, LP, HN, LN, HC and LC, for357
the N-player TD game, using the payoffs in Table 1 and the Methods described above. To begin with,358
in Figure 4 (see also Figure 9 in Appendix), we provide numerical validation for the analytical conditions359
obtained in the previous section regarding when commitment proposing strategies are evolutionarily viable360
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Figure 6: Total frequency of commitment proposing strategies HP and LP as a function of µ and ε.
In general, the commitment proposing strategies are most successful for intermediate values of µ, especially for a
sufficiently small cost of arranging prior commitment ε. Parameters: in all panels, cH = 1, cL = 1 (i.e. c = 1),
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Figure 7: Average population payoff (social welfare) as a function of µ with different values of ε,
showing when commitment is absent against when it is present. We compare results for different values
of β in two game configurations. We observe that whenever µ < 5 (i.e. when there is a need for coordination
to avoid competition in the group), arranging a prior commitment is beneficial to the population social welfare.
Parameters: in panel a, b and c) bH = 6 (i.e. b = 5), in panel d,e and f) bH = 3 (i.e. b = 2). Other parameters:
N = 5, α = 0.5, cH = 1, cL = 1, bL = 2
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strategies (being risk-dominant against others). Similar to the pairwise TD game, we observe that there361
is a threshold for ε below which it is the case. Moreover, Figure 5 shows that the frequencies of these362
strategies (HP and LP) decrease for increasing α. They dominate the population whenever ε is sufficiently363
small (e.g. ε = 0.1 and 1). That is, it is more beneficial to engage in a prior commitment deal when the364
market competition is harsher (i.e. small α). These results are robust for different intensities of selection365
(see Figure 10 in Appendix). In general, our results confirm the similar observations regarding the effects366
of ε and α on the evolutionary outcomes obtained in the pairwise game above.367
We now focus on understanding the effect of the new parameter in the N-player game, µ, on the368
evolutionary outcomes. Recall that µ indicates the demand for high technology (H) in the group, describing369
what is the maximal number of players in the group that can adopt H without reducing their benefit due to370
competition. Figure 4 shows the effect of different values of µ on the frequency or evolutionary success of all371
strategies as a function of ε. When µ is small to intermediate, and the cost of arranging prior commitment372
is also small, the commitment proposing strategies are dominant. This suggests that arranging prior373
commitments might be more beneficial in such instances. These results also imply that µ is very essential374
in determining when commitment should be initiated. Apparently, the greater need for a group mixture375
or market diversity of technologies, indicating a more difficult coordination situation, the greater need for376
the utilization of commitment to enhance coordination among players is. This observation is even more377
evident in Figure 6, where we examine the success of commitment for varying µ and ε, in regards to two378
different game configurations. It can be observed that an intermediate value of µ leads to the highest379
frequency of commitment strategies, especially in the more difficult coordination situation (i.e. the right380
panel).381
We now closely examine the gain in terms of social welfare improvement when using prior commitments.382
As shown in Figure 7, whenever µ < N (N = 5), i.e. there is a need to coordinate among the group players383
to avoid competition that induces benefit reduction, prior commitments lead to increase of social welfare.384
This increase is more significant in the more difficult coordination situation (i.e. the lower row) and when385
the cost of arranging commitment is low, which is also slightly more significant for intermediate values of386
µ and higher values of intensity of selection, β.387
5 Conclusions and Further Discussion388
We have described in this paper novel evolutionary game theory models showing how prior commitments389
can be adopted as an efficient mechanism for enhancing coordination, in both pairwise and multi-player390
interactions. For that, we described technology adoption (TD) games where technology investment firms391
would achieve the best collective outcome if they can coordinate with each other to adopt a mixture of392
different technologies. To this end, a parameter α was used to capture the competitiveness level of the393
product market and how beneficial it is to achieve coordination, while another parameter µ to capture394
the optimal coordination mixture or diversity of technology adopters in a group (in the pairwise case, we395
assume the optimal mixture is where two firms adopt different technologies to avoid conflict).396
In the coordination settings, there are multiple desirable outcomes and players have distinct preferences397
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in terms of which outcome should be agreed upon, thus leading to a larger behavioural space than in the398
context of cooperation dilemmas (Han et al., 2013, 2017, 2015a; Sasaki et al., 2015; Hasan and Raja,399
2013). We have shown that whether commitment is a viable mechanism for promoting the evolution of400
coordination, strongly depends on α: when α is sufficiently small, prior commitment is highly abundant401
leading to significant improvement in terms of social welfare (i.e. population avarage payoff), compared402
to when commitment is absent. Importantly, we have derived the analytical condition for the threshold of403
α below which the success of commitments is guaranteed, for both pairwise and multi-player TD games.404
Furthermore, moving from pairwise to a multi-player setting, it was shown that µ plays an important role405
for the success of commitment strategies as well. In general, when µ is intermediate, equivalent to a high406
level of diversity in group choices, arranging prior commitments proved to be highly important. It led to407
significant improvement in terms of social welfare, especially in a harsher coordination situation.408
In the main text, we have considered that a fair agreement is arranged. In the Appendix (Figure 8), we409
have shown that whenever commitment proposers are allowed to freely choose which deal to propose to their410
co-players, our results show that, in a highly competitive market (i.e. small α), commitment proposers411
should be strict (i.e. sharing less benefits), while when the market is less competitive, commitment412
proposers should be more generous.413
In both pairwise and multi-player coordination settings, our analysis has shown that the cost of arrang-414
ing agreement must be sufficiently small, to be justified for the cost and benefit of coordination. This is in415
line with previous works in the context of PD and PGG (Han et al., 2013, 2017, 2015a). It is due to the416
fact that those who refuse to commit can escape sanction or compensation. Solutions to this problem have417
been proposed in the context of PD and PGG, namely, to combine commitment with peer punishment,418
intention recognition, apology or social exclusion to address non-committers (Han and Lenaerts, 2016; Han419
et al., 2015b,a; Martinez-Vaquero et al., 2017; Quillien, 2020) or to delegate the costly process of arranging420
commitment to an external party (Cherry and McEvoy, 2013; Cherry et al., 2017). Our future work will421
investigate how to combine prior commitments with such mechanisms to provide a more adaptive and422
efficient approach for coordination enhancement in complex systems.423
Prior commitments and agreements have been used extensively in the context of distributed and self-424
organizing multi-agent systems, for modelling and engineering a desirable correct behaviour, such as co-425
operation, coordination and fairness (Singh, 1991; Chopra and Singh, 2009; Winikoff, 2007). These works426
however do not consider the dynamical aspects of the systems nor under what conditions for instance427
regarding the relation between costs and benefits of coordination and those of arranging a reliable commit-428
ment, commitment proposing strategies can actually promote a high level of desirable system behaviour.429
Thus, our results provide important insights into the design of such distributed and self-organizing (adap-430
tive) systems to ensure high levels of coordination, in both pairwise and multi-party interactions (Bonabeau431
et al., 1999; Pitt et al., 2012).432
In future work, we will consider how commitments can solve more complex collective problems, e.g. in433
a technological innovation race (Han et al., 2020), bargaining games (Zisis et al., 2015; Rand et al., 2013),434
climate change actions (Barrett et al., 2007; Santos et al., 2020) and cross-sector coordination (Santos435
et al., 2016), where there might be a large number of desirable outcomes or equilibriums, especially when436
the number of players in an interaction increases (Duong and Han, 2015; Gokhale and Traulsen, 2010).437
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Overall, our work has demonstrated that commitment is a viable tool for promoting the evolution of438
diverse collective behaviours among self-interested individuals, beyond the context of cooperation dilem-439
mas where there is only one desirable collective outcome (Skyrms, 1996; Barrett et al., 2007). It thus440
provides new insights into the complexity and beauty of behavioral evolution driven by humans’ capacity441
for commitment (Frank, 1988; Nesse, 2001).442
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7 Appendix446
7.1 Results for different values of θ1 and θ2447
In the main text, we assume that a fair agreement is always arranged. We consider here what would448
happen if HP and LP can personalise the commitment deal they want to propose, i.e. any θ1 and θ2 can449
be proposed (instead of always being fair). Namely, Figure 8 shows the average population payoff varying450
these parameters, for different values of α. We observe that when α is small, the highest average payoff is451
achieved when θ1 is sufficiently small and θ2 is sufficiently large, while for large α, it is reverse for the two452
parameters. That is, in a highly competitive market (i.e. small α), commitment proposers should be strict453
(HP keeps sufficient benefit while LP requests sufficient payment, from their commitment partners), while454
when the market is less competitive (i.e. large α), commitment proposers should be more generous (HP455
proposes to give a larger benefit while LP requests a smaller payment, from their commitment partners).456
Our results confirm that this observation is robust for different values of ε, δ and β.457
7.2 Numerical confirmation of risk-dominant conditions in the N-player game458
See Figure 9 for numerical results confirming the risk-dominant conditions in the N-player game in the459
main text.460
7.3 Results for other intensities of selection in the N-player game461
Figure 10 confirms similar observations for other values of intensity of selection (β) in the N-player TD462
game, as compared to Figure 5 in the main text.463
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Figure 8: Average population payoff as a function of θ1 and θ2, for different values of α and β (for pairwise
TD games). When α is small (panels a and b), the highest average payoff is achieved when θ1 is sufficiently small
and θ2 is sufficiently large, while for large α (panel c), it is the case when θ1 is sufficiently large and θ2 is sufficiently
small. Figure 4 also shows that for a small value of β, the highest average payoff is achieved when α is very minimal
compared to other panels with higher value of β (compare panel a, d and g). Parameters: in all panels cH = 1,
cL = 1, bL = 2 (i.e. c = 1), and bH = 6 (i.e. b = 5). Other parameters: δ = 4, ε = 1; β = 0.01, 0.1 and 1;
population size Z = 100.
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Figure 9: Validation for the analytical conditions under which HP is risk dominant against strategy
HC, LC, HN and LN, see main text. In all cases, with a small value of ε, the HP strategy dominated
other players. This result of this figure is in close accordance with our equations derived above. Namely, the
risk-dominance thresholds of ε for HP (LP) playing against HC, LC, HN and LN, are, 1.05, 1.31, 12.0 and 58.75,
respectively. We notice a small difference between numerical and theoretical results, since the latter ones are
approximated for larger population sizes. Parameters: in all panels, N = 5, cH = 1, cL = 1, bH = 6 (i.e. b = 5),
µ = 2, and α = 0.5.
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Figure 10: Frequency of six strategies HP, LP, HN, LN, HC and LC, as a function of α and for
different values of ε and β. The commitment proposing strategies HP and LP dominate the population when
the values of α and ε are sufficiently small, in all cases of β. Furthermore, as the value of ε increases, the non-
proposing strategies dominate the population. Parameters: in all panels cH = 1, cL = 1, bL = 2 (i.e. c = 1),
bH = 6 (i.e. b = 5); Other parameters: N = 5, ε = 0.1, 1, 2; β = 0.01, 0.1, 1.
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